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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HENRY H. FORRER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STUART REED, RUSSELL REED,
DONALD REED, FRANKLIN REED,
MARGARET REED, CORDIE MAE
REED and LAWANNA KAY REED,
Defendants-Counter-Plaintiffs
and Respondents/

Case No. 14572

vs.
HENRY H. FORRER, ROBERT
SATHER, EZILDA HENDRICKS,
CHARLES HENDRICKS, ROGER
L. ROBERSON and ETHEL
LaVERNIA ROBERSON,
Counter-Defendants and Appellants.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to quiet title in the plaintiff, Henry
H. Forrer and his wife (hereafter the "Forrers") to a certain
piece of real property located in Uintah County, State of Utah and
described as follows (hereafter the "subject property"):
TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH, RANGE 1 WEST, U.S.M.
Section 35: The East half of the Southeast
quarter of the Northwest quarter; the West
half of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter.
The defendants-counter-plaintiffs and respondents (hereafter the

-2"respondents") are the record holders of a mortgage on that property and are seeking foreclosure of their mortgage.

They also

are seeking, in the alternative, a determination that title to
said property properly lies with them by reason of an unrecorded
quit-claim deed, executed by their mother, Ezilda Van Hendricks,
and delivered to R. Earl Dillman, her attorney at that time.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court decreed that the plaintiff was the legal
owner of the subject property but further decreed that the property was subject to the respondents1 mortgage.

The respondents

were granted judgment on their counter-claim against the Ezilda
Van Hendricks and Charles Hendricks in the amount of $15,750.00
plus $25.60 court costs and interest at the rate of eight (8%)
percent per annum from the date of judgment until paid.

The

subject property was ordered foreclosed to satisfy said judgment.
The default of Stuart Reed, Russell Reed and Donald Reed was entered.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants are seeking reversal of the Trial Court's
decision foreclosing the property.

The respondents are seeking

affirmation of that decision but reversal of the Trial Court's
decision in not awarding the title to the property to respondents
and in not awarding respondents their attorney fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents agree with appellants that the Pre-Trial
Stipulation entered into between the parties which contains, inter alia, a statement of facts,governs the factual situation presented to the court.

-3ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION AWARDING TJHE RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE COUNTER-DEFENDANTS AND ORDERING
THE FORECLOSURE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS PROPER
AND SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.
A. The appellants have failed^ to show that the
trial court's decision was clearly erroneous and not supported
by the evidence.

The appellants failed to introduce evidence

disputing the indebtedness to respondents and, in fact, stipulated that such indebtedness did exist (Stip. p. 3).—'

Appel-

lants further stipulated that the mortgage when created and
recorded constituted a valid lien upon the siibject property
(Stip. p. 3) and failed to introduce any evidence proving that
the indebtedness had been repaid or otherwise satisfied. Notwithstanding their stipulation to the contrary, appellants have
maintained to both the trial court and in their brief herein
(App. p. 3)=y that the mortgage was not valid.

Patently, this

position is untenable.
Even if appellants were allowed to raise this
issue, their argument is without merit.

"As a rule, anything

or any interest capable of passing by purchase or descent is
capable of being encumbered by a mortgage." 55 AmJur2d §106,
Mortgages. Even mortgages of property to be 4cquired in the
future were validated in equity. Id., §109.

In any event, the

1/ The Pre-Trial Stipulation of the parties will hereafter be
referred to in the text as lfStip. p. ."
2/ Appellants1 brief herein will be referred to in the text as
"App. p . _ . "

-4title held by an Indian to restricted land is tantamount to fee
ownership, with the exception that there are restrictions on
3/
alienation.— It has been held that the initial selection of an
allotment of land is the inception of title and the patent,
4/
when issued, relates back to the allotment.—

The appellants1

argument that only recording in the County Recorder's office
begins a chain of title is simply incorrect.

Any competent title

research must examine the status of the title from the U.S. government to insure that the patent was issued properly according
to law and to insure that there are no restrictions or reservations
applicable by law to the land in question.—

Given the validity

of Federal chains of title, and especially with Indian lands
where ownership may be transferred prior to issuance of patent,
any prudent purchaser will examine that Federal chain.

Had the

appellants done so in this case, they would have discovered the
minority of the respondents and the trust nature of their seller
to the respondents.
B. Neither the doctrine of laches nor the running
of a period of limitations operates to defeat the respondents' enforcement of their mortgage.

Appellants place great reliance upon

the expiration of a number of years from the creation of the mortgage to its foreclosure as supportive of the argument that foreclosure should be denied.

With regard to the equitable argument,

3/ See, e.g., U.S. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 60 F.Supp. 411 (1945).
afffd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 138 F.2d 730, cert. den. 331 U.S. 842.
4V De Graffenried v. Iowa Land & Title Co., 20 Okla. 687, 95 P.624 (1908),
5/ See, e.g.,U.S. v. Frisbee,57 F.Supp. 299 (D.C. Mont. 1944) where mineral rights were preserved in the Indian notwithstanding an apparent conveyance
of them by issuance of a patent. See, also, 25 U.S.C. Sec. 311-328(right-of-ways).

-5however, it must be noted that appellants did not introduce evidence, other than the passage of time, upon which the trial court
could base a finding that the period of time was unreasonable. In
fact, the record indicates that the trial court considered the
minority of the respondents, the trust relationship and breaches
thereof by their guardian and the trust source of the funds used
to purchase the subject property by the mothelr in finding that
the passage of time did not make it unreasonable to enforce the
mortgage. In fact, the record shows that the mother brought suit
subsequent to October 13, 1966, against Robert Sather to seek a
quiet title to the subject property in her favor (Stip. p.2).
While her suit was dismissed, this factor further supports a finding that the respondents delay in foreclosing their mortgage was
justified in as much as when that suit was filled, the four youngest
children were still minors.

The record amply supports the trial

court's decision in this regard.
In their argument regarding the statute of limitations, appellants seem to confuse §78-12-18 lltah Code Annotated
(1953 rev.ed.) [providing a three year period in which to sue for
recovery of estates sold by a guardian] with §78-12-23 Utah Code
Annotated (1953 rev.ed.) [providing a six year period of limitations and which section has been held to apply to mortgage foreclosures. Crompton v. Jenson, 78 U. 55, 1 P2d 242(1931)].

With

regard to the trial court's decision on the mortgage foreclosure,
the latter period applies.

Appellants contend that the appoint-

ment of the counter-defendant and mother of respondents as their
guardian, on March 19, 1958, should begin the running of the per-

-6iod of limitations (App. p. 7ff). This argument clearly is contrary to Utah law [§78-12-21] which provides that a period of
limitations does not begin running against one under a disability
until that disability ends.

Further, the general rule is that

the appointment of a guardian does not have the effect of starting periods of limitation running [see, 86 A.L.R.2d 965, Annotation, Limitations of Actions - Disabilities].

In certain sit-

uations, the courts have started the period running when a guard6/
ian has been appointed— but in those cases the guardian or trustee
could have asserted the action on behalf of the minors and was
not an adverse party to the minors.

To apply that exception to

this case would be to require the guardian to sue herself; a most
illogical and untenable position despite appellants argument that
this should be required [App. p. 9]. The trial court did not
accept this argument and for good reason: if this were the rule,
a guardian could sell property to individuals who could buy with
the knowledge that the statute would begin running from that point.
Upon attaining majority, the minors would find their only recourse
against thesir guardian, the statute having run against the purchaser.
Adopting appellants1 argument on this point would eliminate the
protection afforded those under a disability by Utah law.

The

trial court rejected appellants1 argument and held that the statute
began running when the youngest child reached majority.—7/ Apart
from their argument above and their argument on severability of
the respondents1 interests, appellants suggest no other period

J3/ See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jensen, 24 U. 108, 66 P.773, and Dignan v.
Nelson, 26 U. 186, 72 P. 936 (1903).
7/ Decision, dated January 2, 1976, page 2.

-7to begin the running and thus fail to carry tjieir burden.
Appellants argued to the trial court that it should
sever the interests of each of the respondents and begin the period running against each of them as they reached majority.

For

the respondents participating in this appeal, that argumentf even
if accepted, has no

bearing since Franklin Rieed, oldest of the

participants in this appeal, reached majority on October 7f 1967
(Stip. p. 5). The statute would not run and foreclose his action
until October 7, 1973. However, the respondents' claim was asserted
on February 22, 1973, in advance of that tim0.

The argument that

the respondents1 action was not "commenced" Until the counterclaim was filed in 1974, ignores the provision of Rule 15, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure:
11

(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading, the amendment relates back
to the date of the original pleading."

In as much as respondents were granted leave to file an amended
answer and counter-claim and since their original answer contained
an assertion of the validity of the mortgage and lien, the amendment arose out of the original pleading and related back.
Appellants1 argument on this point, however, is
without merit.

The mortgage was created to secure the indebted-

ness which arose when the respondents1 trust funds were used by
their mother.

It was given in favor of the respondents collectively

and recited one amount due.

To hold that this mortgage was sever-

able would mean, theoretically, that as each of the respondents
reached majority they could make demand upon their mother for their

-8share of the indebtedness and, assuming a failure of payment, would
then sue for foreclosure.

This could mean that possibly seven

separate foreclosures would be necessary; it could mean that at
the time the oldest reached majority the subject property may
not have had a value which would compensate all the respondents and
therefore each share of the indebtedness would be smaller; this
would require counsel for seven individuals (the court having to
appoint counsel for the remaining minors); ifi net effect, it would
mean judicial re-writing of the mortgage itself.
reasonable and the trial court so held.

This end is not

In determining whether

or not to partition an estate, the court must look at the consequences to the beneficiaries.

For example, In re Vorhees'

Estate, 12 U.2d 361, 366 P.2d 977 (1961), where partition would
mean prejudicing one of the beneficiaries, it was disallowed.
In this case, the one clear point in time whe it is certain that
all of the respondents' are not under a disability and when all
of the consequences above can be avoided is when the youngest
of the respondents reaches majority.—8/ Under this construction,
the respondents1 action was certainly timely commenced.
In summary, respondents had a valid mortgage on
the subject property and had properly recorded it (or, rather,
it was recorded on their behalf).

Within a permissible time

after reaching majority they brought action on the indebtedness
and for foreclosure.

Appellants clearly had notice of the mort-

gage and notice that it secured repayment of trust funds. Appellants have shown no reason why the mortgage should not be foreclosed to satisfy respondents1 judgment.
JS/ Lawaan Kay Reed reached majority on June 15, 197d (Stip. p. 5).

-9C. The trial court properly determined the amount
to which respondents were entitled and property ordered foreclosure to satisfy same. As discussed above, page 8, the appellents1 argument on severability is without merit.

However, they

also argue that even if the mortgage is to be foreclosed, only
4/7ths of the amount of the judgment should b& allowed to foreclose.

This argument is apparently based upon the contention

that the default of the three oldest Reed children in answering
and defending their action should act to terminate said childrens'
interest in the mortgage.

As previously discussed, the mortgage

was not severable and since the statute of 1imitations did not
commence running until the youngest child reached majority, all
interests thereunder remain preserved.

Whether the respondents

in this appeal hold the judgment as constructive trustees for
their older brothers or whether those older brothers have any
claim to the proceeds at all is not a matter tor this appeal and
is of no concern to appellants.

The simple fact is that their

default allowed the appellants to gain by default from them what
appellants won by judgment from respondents herein: namely,
quiet title to the land subject to the mortgage.
Appellants cite in support of their argument on
severability the case of Baker v. Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 P.
117.

That case, however, dealt with the adveirse possession of

land and the court held that the interest of the parties who had
reached their majority were barred from contesting the adverse
possession.

Of course, in that case each parity could bring an

action to preserve his title against an advertse possessor.

In

this case, however, the claim which the appellants wish to bar

-10was founded upon the written instrument, the mortgage.

As discussed

previously, it is not reasonable to require the oldest Reed children to bring a foreclosure action prior to the majority of their
younger siblings.

Since it was not severable and since none of

the interests had been barred by laches or limitations, all interests under the mortgage remain outstanding and due and the trial
court properly awarded judgment based upon the evidence that none
of the indebtedness which the mortgage securred had been satisfied.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN QUIETING TITLE TO THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IN APPELLANT HENRY H. FORRER AND THIS COURT
SHOULD REVERSE THAT DECISION AND AWARD THE OWNERSHIP
OF SAID PROPERTY TO RESPONDENTS.
A. The unrecorded Quit-Claim deeds from Charles
and Ezilda Henricks to the respondents, executed and delivered
sometime during the year 1959, operated to vest title in subject property in the respondents.

The appellants stipulated

that the deeds were executed and delivered but not recorded
(Stip. p. 3-4). At that time, the respondents were all minors
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Uintah and Ouray Reservation,
notified the court (Fourth Judicial District, Uintah County,
Case No. 1458) accordingly (Stip. p. 4). Prior to the execution
and delivery of the deeds, Ezilda Hendricks had been appointed
guardian of the respondents (Stip. p. 3). Since the ownership
interest held by Ezilda Hendricks to the subject property could
be conveyed (see discussion supra, pages 3 -4) by the evidence
in the record that interest was conveyed to the respondents.
The question pertinent to this court really is whether or not

-lithe respondents' title to, subject property could be divested by
Ezilda Hendricks1 subsequent conveyance of the property to the
appellant Sather and his successor in interest, Henry Forrer, both
of whom admittedly had no actual knowledge of the conveyance to
the respondents.
B. The subject property was pftrt of the respondents'
estate in the guardianship action and could npt be sold or conveyed
without court approval. 39 AraJur2d §125, Guardian and Ward, states
the general rule that a guardian has no authority to convey a wards'
real estate without court approval unless authorized to do so by
statute (at 101). Utah law is in accord with that rule [§74-1333, Utah Code Annotated (1953 rev.ed.)] and iln Andrus v. Blazzard,
23 U. 233, 63 P. 888 (1901), held that neither the guardian nor
the court has the power to bind a ward's estate unless expressly
authorized by law to do so.

Further, it is the general rule that

a ward has a right to reclaim "...property wrongfully disposed of
by the guardian...[from]...third parties who knew or should have
known that, for some other reason, the disposition of the property by the guardian was wrongful." 39 AmJur2d §217, Guardian
and Ward, at 165.

Utah courts have allowed Such recovery [See,

Stockyards Nat. Bank of South Omaha v. Bragg4 67 U. 60, 245 P. 966
(1925); Andrus v. Blazzard and Gappmayer v. t|7ilkerson, infra. ] .
The property does not appear as an asset in guardianship and there
is no indication that the court approved or disapproved of the
sale (Stip. p.5). Respondents clearly owned the land and without
court approval, the sale to appellants could not operate to divest
their title and they may now assert that title.

The remaining question

-12i s whether or not the respondents a r e now barred based upon l a c h e s ,
f a i l u r e t o record or s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , from a s s e r t i n g t h e i r
t i t l e t o subject p r o p e r t y .
C. Neither laches nor f a i l u r e t o record t h e i r i n t e r e s t s under the Quit-Claim deed operate to bar r e s p o n d e n t s '
a s s e r t i n g t i t l e t o the s u b j e c t property a g a i n s t a p p e l l a n t s .
As discussed above (supra, page 4 f f ) , the t r i a l court considered
and r e j e c t e d the argument t h a t the lapse of time, i n and of i t s e l f , should bar a s s e r t i o n of the r e s p o n d e n t s ' i n t e r e s t .
d e c i s i o n was founded upon the r e s p o n d e n t s ' m i n o r i t y .

That

Further,

with regard t o t h i s i s s u e of recovery of the land, i t must be
repeated t h a t the a p p e l l a n t s introduced no evidence which would
support the c o u r t ' s r u l i n g in t h e i r

favor.

Unquestionably, a recorded deed takes p r i o r i t y
over an unrecorded deed under Utah law [§57-3-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953 r e v . e d . ) ] .

A c r i t i c a l element of t h a t p r i o r i t y ,

however, i s t h a t the holder of the recorded deed must have taken
i t as a bona fide purchaser without a c t u a l or implied n o t i c e of
the other i n t e r e s t s claimed.

Thus, t h e Utah court s a i d in

Gappmayer v, Wilkenson, 53 U. 236, 177 P. 763 (1918), a t 245:
ff

...[T]he circumstances surrounding the
entire transaction were such that the defendants Wilkenson must have had knowledge
that the children, the plaintiffs in this
action, being nephews and nieces of the
defendant Nelson and the children of Gappmeyer, who assisted in the negotiations,
had an interest in the premises, and that
the defendants Wilkenson, in taking t i t l e
with that knowledge, took i t subject to
any equities or interests that the plaintiffs may have had in said premises."
In t h a t c a s e , the f a t h e r of the defendant minor c h i l d r e n had

-13executed and -delivered deeds to certain property to an escrow
agent but later retrieved these deeds which were never recorded.
Subsequently a deed from the father to Nelson and a deed from
Nelson to Wilkenson were recorded.—' From the record in this case,
the appellants unquestionably had recorded notice that there was
a trust relationship between their predecessor in interest
(Ezilda Hendricks) and the respondents.

The mortgage itself

revealed that it securred the investment of ttust funds. Further, the guardianship proceedings were a matter of record in
Uintah County, the county in which subject property was located.
Certainly under these circumstances a prudent purchaser would
examine the transaction carefully to insure tKiat there were no
claims such as respondentsf which could be asserted against him
despite a clear "recorded" title.

Recorded transactions only

create a presumption of propriety which presumption can be overcome by evidence to the contrary [see, ControjLled Receivables, Inc.
v. Harman, 17 U2d 420, 413 P.2d 807 (1966)]. Because of (1) the
knowledge (actual) that the respondents had at least a mortgage interest
the property; (2) the knowledge (actual) that the respondents
may be minors; (3) the recorded, prior guardianship proceedings;
and (4) the knowledge (actual) that the respondents and their
mother were part-Indian and therefore a Federal trust relationship existed, the appellants should not now be allowed to claim
surprise at learning of the respondents1 unrecorded, but valid title
to the subject property.
Perhaps an even stronger argument to appellants1
claim is seen in the actions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
9/ See, also, Bumham, et.al. v. Eschler, 116 U. 61, 208 P.2d 96 (1949).

-14It is stipulated that because the respondents' mother and stepfather has wrongfully disposed of some of respondents' property,
the BIA felt the respondents needed more security for their
previously advanced trust funds, it insisted upon the execution
of the Quit-Claim deeds in favor of respondents and notified the
court in the guardianship proceeding accordingly (Stip. p. 3-4).
The BIA obviously felt that it had done all that was necessary
to protect respondents1 interests since it knew that property
of wards could not be disposed of without court order and it
had notified the court of their interests.

Further, it obviously

felt that the Quit-Claim deeds would be recorded and hence the
respondents further protected.

One purpose of stare decisis

is to guide citizens in the conduct of their affairs and their
expectations should not be frustrated absent strong considerations
of public policy.—' While it might have followed-up to insure
that the deeds were recorded, the BIA certainly provided sufficient notice of the respondentsf interests that its expectations should not be frustrated.

This is expecially so consider-

ing the weight of recorded information available to appellants
which would reveal the respondents1 interests.

Again, the res-

pondents were not only minors but also wards of the government
(Stip. p. 2) and the records maintained by the BIA regarding
their affairs were part of the Federal chain of title which the
appellants were bound to examine for their own protection.

10/ See, e.g., Colonial Trust Co. v. Flanagan,344 Pa. 556, 25 A2d.
728, 729.

-15D. The respondents are not barred by reason of
expiration of the statute of limitations from asserting their
title to subject property against appellants.

It must be re-

emphasized that appellants have argued for application of § 7812-18 to all aspects of this case.

That section applies in the

context of this claim for recovery of estates where it does not
apply with regard to the foreclosure of the mortgage.

However,

the argument heretofore made regarding the running of periods
of limitations is equally applicable here: thfe statute commenced
running when the youngest of the children reaphed majority. As
previously noted (supra, p.8,n.8) the youngest child reached
majority on June 15, 1970.

Thus the statute would commence run-

ning from that point and would expire on June 15, 1973. The
action having been commenced in February of 1|973, the statute
was tolled. Further, it makes no more sense to sever the interest
under the deeds than it does the interest under the mortgage.

In

fact, the first point at which the respondents could have become
aware of the appellants' adverse interest in the property was
on May 8, 1969, when the court quieted title in the subject property in the appellants as against Ezilda Hendricks by deciding
"no cause of action" on her complaint.—

Certainly the respond-

ents who were of age at the time of that action would be lulled
into believing that since she was still the guardian for their
brothers and sisters her action would preserve their interests,
especially since she alleged that the sale was, in fact, a loan.

11/ That action is referred to in the stipulation (Stip. p. 2) and
is captioned: Ezelda [sic] Reed Hendricks v. Robert Sather, dba Sather
Jewelry and Richard Murray, Fourth Judicial District bourt of Uintah County,
Civil No. 5257.

-16POINT III
RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO BE AWARDED REASONABLE
ATTORNEY FEES AS PART OF THEIR JUDGMENT AND THIS
COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND REMAND WITH INSTRUCTION
TO DETERMINE AND AWARD SAME.
A. The mortgage provided for attorney fees in
the event of default/ only the amount thereof being left unspecified and it was unreasonable to interpret that provision
as barring assessment of attorney fees. Under Utah law, the
court must determine and assess "reasonable" attorney fees in
foreclosure actions [§78-37-9/ Utah Code Annotated (1953 rev.ed.)].
In as much as it has been held that the court must make this
12/
determination independently of any contracted for amount— the
failure to specify a sum certain for attorney fees should not
bar their award.

Again, since the court must determine "reason-

able" attorney feesf it should not be necessary to include that
word; it is read-in as a matter of law of mortgages.

If the

parties had not intended to provide for attorney fees, it is
a more reasonable interpretation that they would strike any reference to attorney fees instead of just leaving the amount blank.
13/ and
The attorney fees are a lien upon the mortgaged premises—'
should therefore be included in the order of foreclosure. Tn as
much as the mortgagors occupied a trust relationship with the mortgagees, the document should be strictly construed against the mortgagors.

The Trial Court not having determined fees, this court

should remand with instructions to calculate the amount of attorney
fees, including fees and costs of this appeal, and award same.

JL2/ See, Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 U. 320, 145 P. 1036 (1915); See,
also, F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 U2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (
).
13/ Jensen v. Lichtenstein, supra, n.12.

-17CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, respondents
urge this court to affirm the trial court's decision awarding
respondents a judgment and order of sale of tfye subject property.
Provided, however, respondents urge this court to reverse the
trial court's decision denying respondents their attorney fees
and to remand the case to the trial court for determination of
attorney fees due respondents for all aspects of this case, including this appeal, and for further instructions to enter judgment in the amount as determined by the trial court and for inclusion of that amount in the decree of foreclosure and order
of sale.
Alternatively, respondents urge this court to
reverse the trial court's decision quieting title to subject
property in appellants and to remand this cast to the trial court
with instructions to quiet title in the subject property in the
respondents and to enter judgment in their favor for their attorney
fees and costs incurred in this action, including this appeal.
Respectfujlly submitted,

R. CLARK ARNOLD
Attorney for Franklin Reed,
Margaret Reed, Cordie Mae
Reed and Lawanna Kay Reed.
Defendants-Counter-Plaintiffs
and Respondents.
922 Kearnls Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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